

pipelines that facilitate the transit of energy into neighboring countries; or

(3) require a waiver under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 (Public Law 116-92; 133 Stat. 2291; 22 U.S.C. 8791 note).

(c) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that—

(1) details United States efforts to work with other governments in the region to develop a plan for the distribution of gas supplies to Lebanon in a manner that reduces Lebanon's dependence on Iran;

(2) assesses the extent to which alternatives to the Arab Gas Pipeline were pursued and considered feasible;

(3) includes a comprehensive overview of the key sources of Lebanon's gas supply before 2020;

(4) the response of the Administration to fuel from Iran entering Lebanon, particularly amid reports that additional vessels have departed Iran; and

(5) a list of entities involved in the production and transport of fuel from Syria to Lebanon in 2020 and 2021.

(d) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

SA 4488. Mr. RISCH submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of subtitle B of title XII of division A, add the following:

SECTION 1216. RESTRICTIONS RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION ASSISTANCE TO THE TALIBAN.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) In August 2021, in response to the Taliban's toppling of the internationally recognized Government of Afghanistan, and growing concerns over reported human rights abuses, donors suspended foreign aid to Afghanistan, which accounts for approximately 40 percent of Afghanistan's gross domestic product.

(2) Among the donors referred to in paragraph (1) are international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, which froze the disbursement of more than \$400,000,000 in emergency currency reserves allocated to Afghanistan because of concerns related to the credibility and legitimacy of the Taliban rule.

(3) The World Bank, which has committed more than \$5,300,000,000 in reconstruction and development funding for Afghanistan since 2002, similarly suspended funding for projects in Afghanistan, citing concerns over how Taliban rule would impact “the country's development prospects, especially for women”.

(4) Since Taliban rule in Afghanistan threatens vital gains achieved in Afghanistan during the past 20 years, particularly

gains regarding the rule of law, counterterrorism, and the rights of women and girls, it should be denied credibility and international legitimacy on the world stage.

(5) In April 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated, “I can say very clearly and categorically that an Afghanistan that does not respect [the rights of women and girls], that does not sustain the gains we've made, will be a pariah.”.

(6) Despite the freeze in funding, the World Bank, along with the rest of the international community—

(A) remains firmly committed to assisting the Afghan people; and

(B) is “exploring ways [through which the World Bank] can remain engaged to preserve hard-won development gains and continue to support the people of Afghanistan.”.

(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to oppose the extension of loans, guarantees, or other financial or technical assistance to the Taliban, any agency or instrumentality of the Government of Afghanistan that is under the direction or control of the Taliban, or any member of the Taliban until the Taliban has—

(1) publicly and privately broken all ties with other terrorist groups, including al Qaeda;

(2) verifiably prevented the use of Afghanistan as a platform for terrorist attacks against the United States or against partners or allies of the United States, including by denying terrorist groups—

(A) sanctuary space in Afghanistan;

(B) transit through Afghan territory; and

(C) the use of Afghanistan for terrorist training, planning, or equipping;

(3) provided humanitarian actors with full, unimpeded access to vulnerable populations throughout Afghanistan, without interference or diversion;

(4) respected freedom of movement, including by facilitating—

(A) the departure of foreign nationals, applicants for the special immigrant visa program, and other at-risk Afghans by air or land routes; and

(B) the safe, voluntary, and dignified return of displaced persons; and

(5) supported the establishment of an inclusive government of Afghanistan that respects the rule of law, press freedom, and human rights, including the rights of women and girls.

(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;

(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(2) INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term “international finance institution” includes—

(A) the International Monetary Fund;

(B) the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development;

(C) the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development;

(D) the International Development Association;

(E) the International Finance Corporation;

(F) the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency;

(G) the African Development Bank;

(H) the African Development Fund;

(I) the Asian Development Bank;

(J) the Inter-American Development Bank;

(K) the Bank for Economic Cooperation and Development in the Middle East and North Africa; and

(L) the Inter-American Investment Corporation.

(d) RESTRICTING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION ASSISTANCE TO THE TALIBAN.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), the Secretary of the Treasury should—

(A) instruct the United States Executive Director of the World Bank Group to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to oppose—

(i) the extension by the International Finance Corporation of any loan, guarantee, or other financial or technical assistance to—

(I) the Taliban;

(II) any agency or instrumentality of the Government of Afghanistan under the direction or control of the Taliban; or

(III) any member of the Taliban; and

(ii) support by the International Finance Corporation of a project that materially benefits the Taliban in Afghanistan;

(B) instruct the United States Executive Director of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to oppose—

(i) the extension by the Bank of any loan, guarantee, or other financial or technical assistance to—

(I) the Taliban;

(II) any agency or instrumentality of the Government of Afghanistan under the direction or control of the Taliban; or

(III) a member of the Taliban; or

(ii) support by the Bank of a project that materially benefits the Taliban in Afghanistan; and

(C) instruct the United States Executive Directors of all other international financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, to work with other key donor countries to develop a coherent policy approach that makes all future engagements with and lending to the Taliban contingent upon the Taliban—

(i) publicly and privately breaking all ties with other terrorist groups, including al Qaeda;

(ii) verifiably preventing the use of Afghanistan as a platform for terrorist attacks against the United States or partners or allies of the United States, including by denying terrorist groups—

(I) sanctuary space in Afghanistan;

(II) transit through Afghan territory; and

(III) the use of Afghanistan for terrorist training, planning, or equipping;

(iii) providing humanitarian actors with full, unimpeded access to vulnerable populations throughout Afghanistan, without interference or diversion;

(iv) respecting freedom of movement, including by facilitating—

(I) the departure of foreign nationals, applicants for the special immigrant visa program, and other at-risk Afghans by air or land routes; and

(II) the safe, voluntary, and dignified return of displaced persons; and

(v) supporting the establishment of an inclusive Government of Afghanistan that respects the rule of law, press freedom, and human rights, including the rights of women and girls.

(2) EXCEPTION FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES.—The restrictions under subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to transactions which are integral to the provision of humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan.

(3) TERMINATION.—Paragraph (1) shall not apply on or after the date that is 30 days after date on which the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Taliban has complied with all of the conditions set forth in subsection (b).

(e) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter until the restrictions under subsection (d)(1) are terminated pursuant to subsection (d)(3), the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall jointly submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes—

(1) the efforts of the United States Executive Directors of international financial institutions to comply with their respective responsibilities under subsection (d)(1);

(2) the status of the Taliban's adherence to international human rights principles that are recognized by the United States; and

(3) the degree to which the Taliban has met its commitments under the peace agreement signed by the United States and the Taliban in Doha, Qatar on February 29, 2020.

SA 4489. Mr. RISCH submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the appropriate place in title XII, insert the following:

SEC. ____ . AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO A COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT TO PROTECT CIVILIANS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES FROM WEAPONIZED UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Houthis in Yemen have significantly intensified the number of cross-border strikes against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since January 2021, using a combination of increasingly sophisticated Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and cruise missiles to target civilian infrastructure, bases, commercial shipping, and major population centers across the Kingdom with unprecedented frequency.

(2) The United Nations has noted the Houthis have deployed extended long-range UAVs with the capacity to strike deep into Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates since at least January 2018.

(3) Between January and April 2021, the Houthis launched upward of 150 UAVs into Saudi Arabia, threatening the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's sovereignty and security, as well as the lives of more than 70,000 United States nationals living there.

(4) Houthi spokesperson Yahya Sarea responded to a realistic peace proposal presented by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in March 2021, by threatening "to carry out stronger and harsher military attacks in the coming period."

(5) United States Government officials, including Special Envoy Timothy Lenderking, have publically underscored the crucial role the Government of Iran plays in driving this growing and continuous threat that emanates from the Houthis in Yemen.

(6) According to United States officials and United Nations experts, the Government of Iran, alongside its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah, are providing sophisticated weapons systems and military training to the Houthis, including technical assistance on the development and employment of UAVs and ballistic missiles.

(7) The Houthi rebels have also made significant advances in their domestic military industrial capacity in recent years, drawing on Iranian sourced components, including guidance systems to develop several new advanced platforms like the Burkan medium range ballistic missile and the Sammad drone series that have extend the Houthi's reach deep into Saudi Arabia.

(8) The Houthi's growing arsenal of increasingly sophisticated drones, and ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles pose a direct threat to United States interests, particularly as relates to regional security, the safety of United States nationals, and the trajectory of United Nations-led peace talks.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States should improve cooperation with allies and likeminded partners to systematically map out, expose, and disrupt missile and drone procurement networks used by the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen;

(2) the partner countries of the United States in the Arabian Peninsula face urgent and emerging threats from unmanned aerial systems and other unmanned aerial vehicles;

(3) joint research and development to counter unmanned aerial systems will serve the national security interests of the United States and its partners in the Arabian Peninsula;

(4) development of counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) technology will reduce the impacts of these attacks, build deterrence, and increase regional stability;

(5) the United States and partners in the Arabian Peninsula should continue to work together to protect United States citizens and personnel in the Middle East and civilians in the Arabian Peninsula in the face of the threat from unmanned aerial systems; and

(6) the United States Government should use all leverage at its disposal to pressure the Houthis to de-escalate cross border attacks, cease their offensive in Marib, and meaningfully engage in United Nations-led peace talks.

(c) AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO AGREEMENT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President is authorized to enter into a cooperative project agreement with countries in the Arabian Peninsula under the authority of section 27 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2767) to carry out research on and development, testing, evaluation, and joint production (including follow-on support) of defense articles and defense services to detect, track, and destroy armed unmanned aerial systems that threaten the United States and its partners in the Arabian Peninsula.

(2) APPLICABLE REQUIREMENTS.—The cooperative project agreement described in paragraph (1)—

(A) shall provide that any activities carried out pursuant to the agreement are subject to—

(i) the applicable requirements described in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of section 27(b)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act; and

(ii) any other applicable requirements of the Arms Export Control Act with respect to the use, transfer, and security of such defense articles and defense services under that Act; and

(B) shall establish a framework to negotiate the rights to intellectual property developed under the agreement.

(d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION WITH RESPECT TO USE OF MILITARY FORCE.—Nothing in this section may be construed as an authorization for the use of military force.

(e) ARABIAN PENINSULA DEFINED.—In this section, the term "Arabian Peninsula" means Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi

Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

SA 4490. Mr. RISCH submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of subtitle E of title XII, add the following:

SEC. 1253. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR COUNTERING CHINESE INFLUENCE FUND.

(a) COUNTERING CHINESE INFLUENCE FUND.—There is authorized to be appropriated \$300,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for the Countering Chinese Influence Fund to counter the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party globally. Amounts appropriated pursuant to this authorization are authorized to remain available until expended and shall be in addition to amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated to counter such influence.

(b) CONSULTATION REQUIRED.—The obligation of funds appropriated or otherwise made available to counter the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party globally shall be subject to prior consultation with, and consistent with section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-1), the regular notification procedures of—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(c) POLICY GUIDANCE, COORDINATION, AND APPROVAL.—

(1) COORDINATOR.—The Secretary of State shall designate an existing senior official of the Department at the rank of Assistant Secretary or above to provide policy guidance, coordination, and approval for the obligation of funds authorized pursuant to subsection (a).

(2) DUTIES.—The senior official designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be responsible for—

(A) on an annual basis, the identification of specific strategic priorities for using the funds authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a), such as geographic areas of focus or functional categories of programming that funds are to be concentrated within, consistent with the national interests of the United States and the purposes of this division;

(B) the coordination and approval of all programming conducted using the funds authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a), based on a determination that such programming directly counters the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party, including specific activities or policies advanced by the Chinese Communist Party, pursuant to the strategic objectives of the United States, as established in the 2017 National Security Strategy, the 2018 National Defense Strategy, and other relevant national and regional strategies as appropriate;

(C) ensuring that all programming approved bears a sufficiently direct nexus to such acts by the Chinese Communist Party described in subsection (d) and adheres to the requirements outlined in subsection (e); and